Determinants of private consumption. Economic Papers No. 135, May 1999 by Bayar, A. & McMorrow, K.
'(7(50,1$1762)35,9$7(
&2168037,21
$%$<$5	.0&02552:
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank A. Dramais for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper as
well as H. Rovers for secretarial assistance.2
'(7(50,1$1762)35,9$7(&2168037,21
7$%/(2)&217(176
(;(&87,9(6800$5<
,1752'8&7,21
6(&7,217+(+,6725,&$/(92/87,212)&2168037,217+(25<
 7KH)DOORI.H\QHV¶$EVROXWH,QFRPH+\SRWKHVLV
 3RVW.H\QHVLDQ &RQVXPSWLRQ 7KHRULHV 5HODWLYH ,QFRPH +\SRWKHVLV
3HUPDQHQW,QFRPH+\SRWKHVLV/LIH&\FOH+\SRWKHVLV
%2;&2168037,2160227+,1*
6(&7,21$5( :($/7+ $1' &855(17 ,1&20( 7+( .(<
'(7(50,1$176 2) &2168037,21" :+$7 ,6 7+( 52/( 2) ,17(5(67
5$7(6"
 .H\'ULYLQJ)RUFHV8QGHUO\LQJ&RQVXPHU%HKDYLRXU5ROHRI7LPH
+RUL]RQ7LPH3UHIHUHQFHDQG&DSLWDO0DUNHW,PSHUIHFWLRQV
 7LPH+RUL]RQ&RQVLGHUDWLRQV
 7LPH 3UHIHUHQFH (IIHFWV ,PSDFW RI WKH LQWHUHVW UDWH RQ
FRQVXPSWLRQ DQG VDYLQJV +RZ JUHDW LV WKH FRQVXPSWLRQ
UHVSRQVHWRYDULDWLRQVLQWKHUHDOUDWHRILQWHUHVW"
 &DSLWDO0DUNHW,PSHUIHFWLRQV
 'HWHUPLQLQJWKH5HODWLYH,PSRUWDQFHRI:HDOWKYHUVXV&XUUHQW,QFRPH
LQWHUPVRI,QIOXHQFLQJ&RQVXPSWLRQWKH(PSLULFDO(YLGHQFH
%2;)25(&$67,1* &2168037,21 02'(//,1* &21680(5 %(+$9,285 ,6 $1
(92/87,21$5<352&(66
6(&7,21)8785(&2168037,2175(1'6,17+(&20081,7<:+$7
$5(7+(/,.(/<.(<,1)/8(1&(629(57+(0(',8072/21*581"
 &RQVXPHU%HKDYLRXUDQG2QJRLQJ%XGJHWDU\&RQVROLGDWLRQ
 ,PSDFW RQ /LTXLGLW\ &RQVWUDLQWV RI 3URJUHVVLYH )LQDQFLDO
/LEHUDOLVDWLRQ
 &RQVXPSWLRQ5HDFWLRQWR6WUXFWXUDO5HIRUPLQWKHIRUPRI7D[DQG
6RFLDO:HOIDUH6\VWHP5HIRUPV
 ,PSDFWRQ&RQVXPSWLRQRI'HPRJUDSKLF3UHVVXUHV
%2;&21680(5%(+$9,285$1'7+(())(&7,9(1(662)),6&$/32/,&<
6(&7,216,08/$7,216:,7+7+(48(67,,02'(/3
([HFXWLYH6XPPDU\
)ROORZLQJDUDSLGRYHUYLHZRIWKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRISOD\LQUHODWLRQWRFRQVXPSWLRQUHVHDUFK
ZLWKUHIHUHQFHEHLQJPDGHWRERWKWKH(XOHUHTXDWLRQDQGWKHPRUHWUDGLWLRQDO³VROYHGRXW´
FRQVXPSWLRQIXQFWLRQDSSURDFKHVDUHDVRQDEO\GHWDLOHGDVVHVVPHQWLVPDGHLQWKHVWXG\
UHJDUGLQJWKHKLVWRULFDOSURJUHVVLRQRIWKLQNLQJLQWHUPVRIFRQVXPSWLRQWKHRU\5HIHUHQFHLV
PDGH WR WKH GHPLVH RI .H\QHV¶ DEVROXWH LQFRPH K\SRWKHVLV IROORZLQJ WKH H[FHVVLYHO\
SHVVLPLVWLF SRVW :: FRQVXPSWLRQ IRUHFDVWV JHQHUDWHG XVLQJ .H\QHVLDQ FRQVXPSWLRQ
IXQFWLRQV7KLVLPSRUWDQWIRUHFDVWLQJIDLOXUHKLJKOLJKWHGQRWRQO\WKHZHDNQHVVRIWKHODWWHU¶V
HPSLULFDOEXWDOVRLWVWKHRUHWLFDOXQGHUSLQQLQJVOHDGLQJWRLWVDEDQGRQPHQWDQGWKHVHDUFK
IRUPRUHUREXVWDOWHUQDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQVRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJSURFHVVHVDWZRUN
)URPWKHUHYLHZRISRVW.H\QHVLDQFRQVXPSWLRQWKHRULHVLQFOXGLQJWKH3HUPDQHQW,QFRPH
3,+ DQG /LIH &\FOH /&+ K\SRWKHVHV WKH VWXG\ KLJKOLJKWV D QXPEHU RI NH\ SRLQWV
LQFOXGLQJWKHSLYRWDOUROHEHLQJSOD\HGLQFXUUHQWFRQVXPSWLRQWKLQNLQJE\WKHQRWLRQRI
OLIHWLPH RU SHUPDQHQW LQFRPH WKH UROH RI H[SHFWDWLRQV DQG WKH LPSRUWDQW DVVXPSWLRQ
FRQFHUQLQJ WKH GHVLUH RI FRQVXPHUV WR VPRRWK RXW WKHLU OLIHWLPH FRQVXPSWLRQ SDWK  $V
UHJDUGVWKHUROHRIIXWXUHH[SHFWDWLRQVWKHODWWHUFDQDIIHFWFXUUHQWFRQVXPHUSDWWHUQVZLWK
RSWLPLVPEHLQJUHIOHFWHGLQKLJKHUFXUUHQWOHYHOVRIFRQVXPSWLRQDQGZLWKSHVVLPLVPKDYLQJ
WKHUHYHUVHHIIHFW,QDGGLWLRQFRQVXPHUVWHQGWRRSHUDWHWRVPRRWKWKHLUFRQVXPSWLRQSDWKV
ZLWK FRQVXPHUV XQGHUJRLQJ LQFRPH GHFOLQHV UHVLVWLQJ GHSDUWXUHV IURP WKHLU SUHYLRXV
FRQVXPSWLRQ OHYHOV DQG ZLWK FRQVXPHUV HQMR\LQJ LQFRPH JDLQV QRW ERRVWLQJ WKHLU
H[SHQGLWXUHVE\DQHTXLYDOHQWDPRXQWXQOHVVWKH\DUHFRQYLQFHGWKDWWKHFKDQJHLQLQFRPHLV
DSHUPDQHQWRQH
7KHSDSHUJRHVRQWRORRNDWWKH3,+/&+YLHZRIWKHZRUOGZLWKDPRUHFULWLFDOH\HDQG
GUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHSRLQWLQJWRDFORVHOLQNEHWZHHQFRQVXPSWLRQWUHQGV
DQGPRYHPHQWVLQFXUUHQWGLVSRVDEOHLQFRPH,WSRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQWKDWLISHUFHSWLRQVRI
OLIHWLPH ZHDOWK DV RSSRVHG WR FXUUHQW LQFRPH DUH VXSSRVHGO\ WKH SULPH GHWHUPLQDQW RI
FRQVXPSWLRQKRZFRPHWKHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHRIWKHOLQNEHWZHHQFRQVXPSWLRQDQGYDULRXV
ZLGHDQGQDUURZGHILQLWLRQVRIZHDOWKLVIDUIURPSHUIHFW
)ROORZLQJDGLVFXVVLRQRQDQXPEHURIFUXFLDOFRQVXPSWLRQSDUDPHWHUVQDPHO\WKHLQIOXHQFH
RQ FRQVXPHU EHKDYLRXU RI WLPH KRUL]RQ DQG WLPH SUHIHUHQFH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DV ZHOO DV
OLTXLGLW\FRQVWUDLQWVWKHVWXG\VXJJHVWVDUDQJHRIFUHGLEOHUHDVRQVZK\RQHFRXOGH[SHFW
GHYLDWLRQVIURPWKH3,+/&+IUDPHZRUNLQFOXGLQJDSUHIHUHQFHDPRQJVWFRQVXPHUVWRGHIHU
UDWKHUWKDQWRVPRRWKFRQVXPSWLRQWKH YLHZWKDW FRQVXPHUV PD\ QRW EH DV UDWLRQDO RU
IRUZDUGORRNLQJDVWKHRU\ZRXOGVXJJHVWLHWKH\PD\KDYHVLPSOHUXOHVRIWKXPEWRJXLGH
WKHLUEHKDYLRXUWKHUROHRISUHFDXWLRQDU\VDYLQJVGXHWRXQFHUWDLQW\RYHUIXWXUHZHDOWKDQG
ILQDOO\ WKH SDUW SOD\HG E\ OLTXLGLW\ FRQVWUDLQWV LQ HQVXULQJ WKDW HYHQ LI WKH\ ZDQWHG WR
FRQVXPHUVDUHRIWHQILQDQFLDOO\XQDEOHWRVPRRWKWKHLUFRQVXPSWLRQSDWKV
,W EHFRPHV FOHDU IURP WKLV ODWWHU DQDO\VLV WKDW ZKLOH WKH UDWLRQDO H[SHFWDWLRQV VFKRRO RI
WKRXJKWPD\JLYHSULPDF\WRWKHUROHRIZHDOWKLQWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIFRQVXPSWLRQWKH
RYHUDOOFRQFOXVLRQRIWKHHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGLVFOHDUDQGXQDPELJXRXVZLWKWKHRYHUULGLQJ
LPSUHVVLRQEHLQJWKDWFRQVXPSWLRQLVDIIHFWHGE\PRYHPHQWVLQWHUPVRIERWKWRWDOZHDOWKDQG
FXUUHQWLQFRPH:HDOWKGHILQHGDVWKHVXPRIILQDQFLDODQGKRXVLQJZHDOWKSOXVWKHSUHVHQW
GLVFRXQWHGYDOXHRIH[SHFWHGIXWXUHODERXULQFRPHLVFOHDUO\WKHGHFLGLQJIDFWRULQWKHORQJ
UXQ  $V UHJDUGV WKH VKRUW WR PHGLXP WHUP KRZHYHU WKH VLWXDWLRQ LV OHVV FOHDUFXW ZLWK
VXEVWDQWLDOHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHTXRWHGLQWKHWH[WZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWFXUUHQWLQFRPHLVVWLOOD
NH\IDFWRULQIOXHQFLQJWKHFRQVXPSWLRQGHFLVLRQVRIDODUJHSURSRUWLRQRIKRXVHKROGVIDFHG
ZLWKXQFHUWDLQW\DQGOLTXLGLW\FRQVWUDLQWV4
,QGLVFXVVLQJWKHUROHRILQWHUHVWUDWHVLQWKHZKROHFRQVXPSWLRQVWRU\WKHVWXG\KLJKOLJKWVWKH
EDVLFFRQIOLFWFRPPRQLQDORWRIDUHDVRIHFRQRPLFVEHWZHHQWKHLQFRPHDQGVXEVWLWXWLRQ
HIIHFWVZLWKLQFUHDVHVLQUHDOLQWHUHVWUDWHVKDYLQJDGXHOHIIHFWQDPHO\LQFUHDVLQJWKHUHWXUQ
RQVDYLQJVLHWKHLQFRPHHIIHFWZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHHQFRXUDJLQJSHRSOHWRVDYHPRUH
EHFDXVHRIWKHKLJKHUUHWXUQLHWKHVXEVWLWXWLRQHIIHFW7KHRYHUDOOHIIHFWRILQWHUHVWUDWH
FKDQJHVRQFXUUHQWDVRSSRVHGWRIXWXUHFRQVXPSWLRQLVWKHUHIRUHDPELJXRXVGXHWRWKHVH
FRPSHWLQJ LQIOXHQFHV  5HDO LQWHUHVW UDWH LQFUHDVHV DUH DOVR DEVRUEHG LQWR FRQVXPHUV
SHUPDQHQWLQFRPHFRPSXWDWLRQVZLWKH[SHFWHGIXWXUHLQFRPHEHLQJPRUHKHDYLO\GLVFRXQWHG
DQGZLWKRYHUDOOZHDOWKFRQVHTXHQWO\GHFOLQLQJ
7KHSDSHUWKHQPDNHVWKHLPSRUWDQWSRLQWWKDWWKHPRGHOOLQJRIFRQVXPSWLRQEHKDYLRXULVD
FRQVWDQWO\HYROYLQJSURFHVV,QDFFXUDFLHVLQFRQVXPSWLRQIXQFWLRQVVXFKDVIRULQVWDQFH
UHODWLQJFRQVXPSWLRQVROHO\WRLQFRPHFDQVHULRXVO\DIIHFWWKHSUHGLFWLYHSRZHURIPRGHOVDV
UHIOHFWHGLQKRZEDGO\WKHODWWHUJRWLWZURQJLQWKHVLHIDLOXUHWRSUHGLFWWKHULVHLQ
VDYLQJVGXHWRLQIODWLRQHIIHFWVDQGDJDLQLQWKHVLHXQGHUHVWLPDWHGWKHIDOOLQVDYLQJV
GXH WR ILQDQFLDO OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ  )ROORZLQJ WKHVH IDLOXUHV WKH VHDUFK IRU DGGLWLRQDO
H[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVZDVLQWHQVLILHG:HDOWKLQWHUHVWUDWHVDQGLQIODWLRQZHUHDOOSHUFHLYHG
WRSOD\DQLQIOXHQWLDOUROHLQWKHVSHQGLQJSODQVRIFRQVXPHUVDQGZHUHFRQVHTXHQWO\XVHGWR
DXJPHQWWKHH[LVWLQJFRQVXPSWLRQHTXDWLRQV
,QORRNLQJDWWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHOLNHO\SDWKRIFRQVXPSWLRQLQWKHIXWXUHLWLVFRQWHQGHGWKDW
HQJDJLQJLQORQJUDQJHIRUHFDVWVZRXOGDGGOLWWOHWRRXUNQRZOHGJHRIFRQVXPHUEHKDYLRXU
GXHWRWKHZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGFRLQWHJUDWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQLQFRPHDQGFRQVXPSWLRQRYHU
WKHORQJHUUXQ7KLVVWXG\FRQVHTXHQWO\VWUHVVHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWU\LQJWRFRQYH\DVHQVHRI
WKHOLNHO\HYROXWLRQRIWKHFRQVXPSWLRQVDYLQJVVSOLWLQWKH&RPPXQLW\EDVHGRQDQDQDO\VLVRI
SODXVLEOH PHGLXP WR ORQJ UXQ LQIOXHQFHV RQ FRQVXPHUV HPDQDWLQJ IURP EXGJHWDU\
FRQVROLGDWLRQILQDQFLDOOLEHUDOLVDWLRQVWUXFWXUDOUHIRUPDQGGHPRJUDSKLFFKDQJHV
$VUHJDUGVWKHSURVSHFWRIRQJRLQJEXGJHWDU\FRQVROLGDWLRQDQXPEHURISRLQWVDUHVWUHVVHG
LQFOXGLQJ
·  ILUVWO\WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFRQVROLGDWLRQLQWHUPVRIERRVWLQJQDWLRQDOVDYLQJVDQGJURZWK
GXHWRWKHVLJQLILFDQWQRQ5LFDUGLDQHIIHFWVDWWDFKLQJWRFXWWLQJGHILFLWVDQGGHEWOHYHOV
7KH GLVWLQFWLRQ LV PDGH EHWZHHQ WKH FODVVLFDO DQG QHRFODVVLFDO YLHZV RI JRYHUQPHQW
EXGJHWVZLWKWKHODWWHUYLHZVWUHVVLQJWKDWILVFDOSROLF\FDQKDYHLPSRUWDQWUHDOHFRQRP\
HIIHFWVDQG
·  VHFRQGO\KRZFRQVXPHUEHKDYLRXUSOD\VDNH\UROHLQGHWHUPLQLQJWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI
ILVFDOSROLF\LHLWVUROHLQERRVWLQJWKHFURZGLQJLQHIIHFWV$QLQVLJKWLVJLYHQDVWRWKH
LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU ILVFDO SROLF\ RI IRUZDUG ORRNLQJ FRQVXPHUV 5LFDUGLDQ (TXLYDOHQFH
YHUVXVPRUHUHDOLVWLFRUVKRUWHUWLPHKRUL]RQP\RSLFFRQVXPHUVDVZHOODVWKHLPSDFWRI
FUHGLWUHVWULFWLRQV
$VUHJDUGVILQDQFLDOOLEHUDOLVDWLRQLWLVSRLQWHGRXWWKDWGLPLQLVKLQJOLTXLGLW\FRQVWUDLQWVRYHU
WLPHLQWKH&RPPXQLW\DVDUHVXOWRIRQJRLQJILQDQFLDOVHFWRUGHUHJXODWLRQVKRXOGLPSO\DOO
RWKHUWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDOWKDWWKHSHUPDQHQWLQFRPHWKHRU\RIFRQVXPSWLRQZLOOSURYLGHD
PRUHDFFXUDWHGHVFULSWLRQRIFRQVXPSWLRQEHKDYLRXULQWKHIXWXUH,IWKLVSURYHVWUXHWKHQ
UHDO HFRQRP\ VKRFNV ZKLFK DUH RI D WHPSRUDU\ RU WUDQVLWRU\ QDWXUH VKRXOG LPSDFW OHVV
VWURQJO\WKDQKLWKHUWRLQWHUPVRIFXUUHQWFRQVXPSWLRQVSHQGLQJ6LQFHVXFKWHPSRUDU\UHDO
HFRQRP\VKRFNVDUHZLGHO\UHJDUGHGWREHWKHPDLQGHWHUPLQDQWRIF\FOLFDOIOXFWXDWLRQVLQ
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\WKLVFRXOGUHVXOWLQDGLPLQXWLRQLQWKHDPSOLWXGHLIQRWWKHUHJXODULW\RI
UHFXUUHQFHRIEXVLQHVVF\FOHVZLWKVLJQLILFDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUVWDELOLVDWLRQSROLF\LHZLWK
IOXFWXDWLRQVEHFRPLQJOHVVYRODWLOHRUVHYHUHWKHUHZLOOEHDZHDNHQHGFDVHIRULQWHUYHQWLRQLQ
WHUPVRIVWDELOLVDWLRQSROLF\5
7KLVODWWHUYLHZLVDOVRFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSUHGLFWLRQVRISRVW.H\QHVLDQWKHRULHVWKDWWKHUH
DUHUHODWLYHO\ORZPDUJLQDOSURSHQVLWLHVWRFRQVXPH03&RXWRIFKDQJHVWRFXUUHQWLQFRPH
HVSHFLDOO\LIWKHVHFKDQJHVDUHSHUFHLYHGWREHWUDQVLWRU\LQQDWXUH&RQVHTXHQWO\LIWKHVKRUW
UXQ03&LVORZWKHQWKHVKRUWUXQPXOWLSOLHUHIIHFWRIFKDQJHVLQ*RYHUQPHQWH[SHQGLWXUH
ZLOODOVREHVPDOO,QRWKHUZRUGV*RYHUQPHQWDFWLRQVHVSHFLDOO\LIWKHODWWHUDUHSHUFHLYHG
DVWHPSRUDU\DLPHGDWVWDELOL]LQJWKHHFRQRP\DUHRQWKHEDVLVRI)ULHGPDQV¶3,+UHODWLYHO\
LQHIIHFWLYH,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHRYHUDOOPDFURHFRQRPLFGHEDWHWKHUHIRUH)ULHGPDQ¶V3,+
FDQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV D GLUHFW DVVDXOW RQ WKH HIILFDF\ RI .H\QHVLDQ VKRUWUXQ GHPDQG
PDQDJHPHQWSROLFLHV,WVKRXOGEHVWUHVVHGKRZHYHUWKDWZKLOHWKHLPSOLFDWLRQRISRVW
.H\QHVLDQ FRQVXPSWLRQ WKHRULHV LV WKDW FRQVXPSWLRQ H[KLELWV JUHDWHU VWDELOLW\ WKDQ
.H\QHVLDQVLPDJLQHGWKLVPXVWEHVHHQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIFRQVXPHUVKDYLQJDVXIILFLHQWO\ORQJ
SODQQLQJKRUL]RQZKLFKHQFRPSDVVHVPRUHWKDQMXVWFXUUHQWLQFRPHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV
$VUHJDUGVPLFURHFRQRPLFUHIRUPVLWLVFRQWHQGHGWKDWIRUZDUGORRNLQJFRQVXPHUVZRXOG
UHDFW WR FUHGLEOH PLFURHFRQRPLF SROLF\ DFWLRQV ZKLFK HQJHQGHU H[SHFWDWLRQV RI KLJKHU
IXWXUHJURZWKUDWHVE\LQFUHDVLQJFXUUHQWFRQVXPSWLRQ$VUHJDUGVWKHVSHFLILFUHIRUPV
GLVFXVVHGLQWKLVSDSHULWLVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHWD[V\VWHPDVZHOODVWKHVRFLDOVHFXULW\DQG
ZHOIDUHV\VWHPVFDQERWKKDYHVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWVRQWKHVDYLQJVEHKDYLRXURIKRXVHKROGV$V
UHJDUGV WD[DWLRQ D VWUXFWXUH ZKLFK UHOLHV GLVSURSRUWLRQDOO\ RQ GLUHFW LQFRPH WD[HV LQ
SUHIHUHQFHWRLQGLUHFWWD[HVWHQGVWROHDGWRDORZHUDJJUHJDWHOHYHORIVDYLQJ/RZHUVDYLQJ
LVOLNHZLVHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKKLJKHU*RYHUQPHQWWUDQVIHUVWRKRXVHKROGV
)LQDOO\FRQFHUQLQJGHPRJUDSKLFFKDQJHVWKHSDSHUVWUHVVHVWKDWDJHLQJZLOOKDYHGLUHFW
HIIHFWVRQVDYLQJVDQGFRQVXPSWLRQSDWWHUQVDVZHOODVLQGLUHFWHIIHFWVWKURXJKLWVLPSDFWRQ
JRYHUQPHQWILQDQFHV
,Q RYHUDOO RSHUDWLRQDO WHUPV WKHUHIRUH RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH FRQFUHWH H[DPSOHV GLVFXVVHG
DERYHWKHVWXG\KLJKOLJKWVWKHIROORZLQJSRLQWVDVUHJDUGVWKHIRUHFDVWLQJRIFRQVXPSWLRQ
·  ILUVWO\ WKDW WKH FRQVXPSWLRQ LPSDFW RI FKDQJHV LQ LQFRPH GHSHQG FUXFLDOO\ RQ WKH
SHUFHSWLRQV RI FRQVXPHUV DV WR WKH WUDQVLWRU\ RU SHUPDQHQW QDWXUH RI WKHVH LQFRPH
FKDQJHVDQG
·  VHFRQGO\WKDWFRQVXPHUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHLPSDFWRIYDULRXVSROLF\PHDVXUHV
RU HYHQWV RQ IXWXUH ³ZHDOWK´ SURVSHFWV FDQ KDYH DQ LPSRUWDQW LPSDFW RQ SUHVHQW
FRQVXPSWLRQSDWWHUQV6
'(7(50,1$1762)35,9$7(&2168037,21
,1752'8&7,21
The Commission’s services Summer 1998 medium-term projections were predicting
an average growth rate for private consumption of around 2¾% over the period 1998-
2002.  This projected rate of growth, being below that for GDP, left room for a strong
expansion of fixed investment and the capital stock over the years in question, with
the result that the Community’s potential rate of growth could be boosted and any
problems in terms of overheating successfully avoided.  Ensuring the realisation of
this latter, highly favourable, overall medium-term scenario requires, as always,
prudent policy management and an acceptance amongst policy makers that its
achievement hinges crucially on a complex set of behavioural relationships
underpinning the economy.  This study looks at one of these key behavioural linkages,
namely the conduct of consumption, and tries to elucidate some of the main driving
forces behind, and influences on, this central component of the growth process itself
and of its cyclical pattern over time.
*52:7+$1'92/$7,/,7<: Households’ consumption choices are important to
both growth and cyclical fluctuations.
·  Regarding  JURZWK, the distribution of society’s resources between current
consumption and physical and human capital investment constitutes the basis for
long run changes in an economy’s standards of living.  That resource distribution
is influenced on the household side by the allocation of incomes between savings
and consumption, with the latter split being tempered by rates of return and time
horizon considerations as well as other constraints.
·  Concerning the question of IOXFWXDWLRQV, given the sheer size of consumption in
overall demand it is imperative to understand the latter’s determinants if we are to
assess the impact on aggregate output of fiscal and monetary policy changes as
well as technology shocks.  In this regard, it should be stressed that investment is
much more volatile than consumption since changes in the latter, unlike the
former, are generally bounded above by changes in income.  Consequently, even
if the change in income is perceived to be a permanent one, the boost to consumer
spending will be less than or equal to the income boost whereas the change in
investment in certain circumstances could substantially exceed such a
“permanent” change in income.
.((1 5(6($5&+ ,17(5(67: It is hardly surprising, given that private
consumption comprises well over half of aggregate economic expenditure, that
consumer behaviour constitutes one of the most important, and indeed one of the most
active, areas of economic research.  Given the frenzied pace of activity in this area it
is perhaps inevitable that wide differences of opinion continue to persist on how best
to characterise the behaviour of consumption empirically.  For the purposes of
simplification one can group these disparate views into two broad schools of thought
with:
·  one group emphasising the importance of defining optimal behaviour in a world of
efficient financial markets and “LQILQLWHO\´ lived consumers and
·  with the other focussing more on the effect of financial market imperfections (e.g.
liquidity constraints), the role of uncertainty, the widespread use of simple “rules
of thumb” to guide consumer behaviour and life cycle effects.7
The first school of research uses what is known as the (XOHUHTXDWLRQDSSURDFK which
assumes rational expectations and focuses on defining optimal, intertemporal,
behaviour i.e. rational, infinitely lived consumers maximise their utility subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint.  Most of the recent empirical work on consumption
has adopted this research approach.  This latter approach is normally associated with
the pioneering work of Robert Hall of Stanford University who, in a paper in 1978,
put forward the so called ³UDQGRP ZDON´ WKHRU\ RI FRQVXPSWLRQ which basically
purported that changes in consumption were largely unpredictable.
This latter conclusion, if correct of course, would have enormous implications for the
more traditional ³VROYHGRXW´FRQVXPSWLRQIXQFWLRQDSSURDFK, which uses empirical
models to explain the behaviour of consumption, since it implies that the latter has no
forecasting value.  At the moment, however, the empirical evidence in support of the
random walk theory is far from conclusive.  In fact, the main contention of this paper
is that while a knowledge of ZHDOWK FRQVLGHUDWLRQV G\QDPLFV DQG WKH LPSDFW RI
H[SHFWDWLRQV is clearly essential, attention also needs to be focussed on questions such
as OLTXLGLW\ FRQVWUDLQWV XQFHUWDLQW\ DQG WKH UROH RI FXUUHQW LQFRPH if an in-depth
understanding of real world consumption trends is to be achieved.
The paper is structured as follows: following a discussion on the evolution of
consumption theory in section one, the paper goes on in the subsequent section to
critically examine the widely accepted permanent income / life cycle hypotheses
concerning consumer behaviour in terms of the empirical evidence.  Attention is also
devoted to the role of time horizon, time preference and capital market imperfections
in determining the consumption / savings split of individual consumers.  The section
finishes with a short discussion on modelling consumption (Box 2), stressing the
forecasting inadequacies of an essentially Keynesian framework due to its insufficient
attention to expectations and forward looking behaviour.  Section three then goes on
to examine the likely key influences on consumption trends in the Community over
the medium to long run.  The reaction of consumption to both ongoing budgetary
consolidation and financial liberalisation, the impact of taxation and social welfare
reforms and finally the effect of demographic changes are all looked at.  In the last
section the results of a number of simulations with the Commision services’ QUEST
II model are presented.8
6(&7,21  7+( +,6725,&$/ (92/87,21 2)
&2168037,217+(25<
Most present day commentators accept some version of the permanent income / life
cycle (PIH/LCH) theory of consumption with the simple Keynesian consumption
function approach, with its suggestion that current disposable income
1 is the main
determinant of consumer spending, no longer taken seriously because of both its
theoretical and long-run empirical inadequacies.
7+()$//2).(<1(6¶$%62/87(,1&20(+<327+(6,6$,+
·  7KHRUHWLFDOO\, the forward looking aspect of the PIH/LCH approach gives it an
analytical edge over the Keynesian approach since it is explicitly predicated on the
utility maximising behaviour of consumers and consequently considers future as
well as current income.
·  (PSLULFDOO\, it was discovered that the longer term properties of Keynes
consumption function, with its emphasis on current income, behaved poorly with
its implication that the average propensity to consume, APC (i.e. the ratio of
consumption to income) would decline as incomes grew since the APC is higher
at low income levels relative to that at higher income levels.
Given the credibility gained from the short run, business cycle, evidence being
consistent with Keynes’ views in the 1930s, it was feared by many commentators
using the Keynesian approach that the end of World War II would lead to the Great
Depression all over again because of domestic demand shortages emanating
essentially from consumption.
Thankfully, Keynes was proven wrong, with his post WWII forecasts for consumption
growth proving excessively pessimistic since no trend decline in the APC materialized
after the war.  As a result of this forecast failure, the Keynesian propensity to consume
became primarily an analysis tool for the short-run i.e. for a single business cycle.
The empirical foundations of the Keynesian function were further undermined with
the publication by Kuznets in 1946 of longer-run US data, covering the period 1879-
1938, which confirmed the stability of the APC over a much longer stretch of time.
This data set showed that if decade averages were taken as opposed to the shorter run
of business cycle data which had been used up until then, it became evident that the
APC showed no tendency to decline secularly (i.e. in the US it stayed relatively
constant at around 0.9).
                                                
￿6RXUFHVRI+RXVHKROGGLVSRVDEOHLQFRPH
In terms of disposable income, households have access to the following main sources:
·  they receive wages and salaries for supplying labour to firms and to the government
·  they derive a share of the gross operating surplus of enterprises, through dividend payouts on share
ownership or as a result of their self-employed status.
·  they benefit from income transfers from the government (e.g. unemployment benefits etc.) and
from overseas.
·  they earn interest payments from their bond holdings.
The total of all the above income components net of taxes and social security contributions constitutes
the overall disposable income available to households with the consumption function determining the
split into savings and expenditure.9
3267.(<1(6,$1&2168037,217+(25,(6
A large number of alternative hypotheses were formulated which tried to reconcile the
cyclical or short-run achievements of the Keynesian consumption
2 function with its
failures in the long-run
·  5HODWLYH,QFRPH+\SRWKHVLV'XHVHQEHUU\
·  3HUPDQHQW,QFRPH+\SRWKHVLV)ULHGPDQ
·  /LIH&\FOH+\SRWKHVLV0RGLJOLDQL
All of the above three theories are intertemporal choice theories i.e. the choice
between current consumption and savings or higher levels of future consumption.  All
three were able to provide adequate explanations for the following empirically
observed phenomena:
·  6KRUW±UXQ RU EXVLQHVV F\FOH GDWD showed that the consumption to
income (C/Y) ratio (i.e. the APC) varied inversely with income
during cyclical fluctuations, with the ratio being greater than average
during downturns and smaller than average during boom periods – in
other words, over a short-run horizon, as income fluctuates or
deviates from its long-run trend growth, the marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) is less than the average propensity to consume
(APC) i.e. consumption displays a flatter Keynesian path.
·  As regards the ORQJUXQ, on the basis of trend data there appeared to
be no tendency for the C/Y ratio to change i.e. consumption is a
constant proportion of permanent lifetime income.  Consequently
MPC=APC as income grows along trend.
·  5HODWLYH,QFRPH+\SRWKHVLV: Duesenberry contended that the utility of consumers
depended not so much on their absolute income (Keynes’ view), but rather on
their relative income, both current income relative to previous income and current
income relative to the income of others in society with whom the consumer feels
in competition with.  Consequently, economy-wide increases in absolute incomes
which do not affect the relative income distribution will have little impact on the
behaviour of consumers in terms of the share of income consumed.  The latter is
Duesenberry’s explanation for the stability of the average propensity to consume
over long periods of time.
·  3HUPDQHQW ,QFRPH +\SRWKHVLV: Friedman put forward the thesis that a
household’s consumption was proportional to its permanent income i.e. the
average income which a household could reasonably expect to earn over its
particular planning horizon.  This hypothesis grew out of the long observed fact
that incomes other than current disposable income affected current patterns of
consumption.  The permanent income hypothesis can explain both the long-run
                                                
2  It should be mentioned that unlike Keynesian consumption theory which explains “consumer
expenditure” trends, both the PIH and LCH explain “consumption”.  The distinction is important since
consumption, while it includes all expenditure on non-durables it only counts a depreciation charge for
the use of consumer durables.10
constancy of the consumption to income ratio (i.e. constancy of APC) while at the
same time explaining why this ratio varies inversely with income during cyclical
fluctuations.
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) provides intuitive explanations for many
of the more important aspects of consumer behaviour with, at its heart, the fact
that over long periods of time variations in permanent income reflect variations in
aggregate income growth in an economy i.e. permanent increases in the
economy’s resources.  On the policy front it can guide policymakers as to the
most effective policy course by, for example, explaining the relatively small
economic impact which temporary tax cuts would engender compared with a
permanent reduction.
·  /LIH &\FOH +\SRWKHVLV Modigliani and his collaborators, most notably Ando,
formulated the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH).  The LCH is similar in many aspects
to the PIH in that again, as with the PIH, consumption is a constant proportion of
income.  However, according to this view consumption is dependent on the
position of the individual in the life cycle, with the objective of the average
consumer being to even out consumption over a lifetime in which income
fluctuates substantially depending on age.  In the young adulthood and retirement
phases, when income received is low, consumption patterns are maintained
through recourse to borrowing or by drawing down past savings.  Consequently
in these phases of the life cycle, consumption is a high proportion of income.  As
regards the middle phase, when income tends to be relatively high, savings are
built up to finance post-retirement consumption with the result that a smaller
proportion of income is consumed in this phase.  This generates the well
documented hump-shaped pattern of savings over a lifetime.
In the most normal formulation of the life-cycle hypothesis, the lifetime planning
horizon of the individual consumer, combined with the expected proportionality
between consumption and permanent income, ensures that no net lifetime savings
are planned with transfers to heirs only being equivalent to their own initial
inheritance
3.  Changes in current income influence changes in current
consumption only to the extent that such changes can be regarded as being
permanent and consequently justify a recalculation of lifetime consumable
resources.  In the event of temporary income gains, the consumption impact is
likely to be small.
All three theories have a basic grounding in the microeconomic theory of consumer
choice.  This is particularly true in the case of the PIH and LCH hypotheses which
explicitly assume that the driving principle underlying observed consumer behaviour
is that of rational consumers attempting to maximise utility by allocating their
permanent incomes (i.e. their lifetime stream of earnings) to an optimum pattern of
lifetime consumption.  The relative income hypothesis (RIH), on the other hand, is
somewhat at odds with the traditional microeconomic theory of consumer behaviour
since it violates the key assumption that an individuals preferences should be
independent of the consumption behaviour of others.  This is one of the reasons for
                                                
3 This is in sharp contrast to the Ricardian view where current generations are assumed to have strong
inter-generational ties.  Unlike life cycle consumers the Ricardian variety are assumed to have
“infinite” lives in the sense that they are strongly linked to their descendants via a bequest motive.11
the failure of the RIH to command the same empirical interest as does the PIH/LCH
approaches.
In addition, the success of the PIH/LCH approach was not only built on its solid
grounding in microeconomic utility maximising theory but also on its empirical
explanatory power being consistent, as it was, with both the short-run and long-run
evidence.  Over the long-run, it suggested that wealth (i.e. permanent income) was the
main determining factor in terms of consumption and that the consumption to wealth
ratio was a stable one.  As regards the short-run it encompasses the Keynesian
approach by explaining why over the business cycle consumption fluctuates less than
disposable income as a result of consumption smoothing by consumers – which has
the effect of evening out consumption in the face of fluctuating income (see Box on
Consumption Smoothing).
6800$5<2)6(&7,21: The essential points to be retained from the above
review of post-Keynesian consumption theories are:
·  )LUVWO\, the key role played in current consumption thinking of the notion of
permanent or lifetime income, the role of expectations and the important
assumption concerning the desire of consumers to smooth out their lifetime
consumption path.
·  The points raised in the previous indent translate themselves into the following
WZRFRQFOXVLRQV relating to forecasting the impact of changes in income on actual
consumption spending:
& Firstly, the consumption impact of changes in income depend crucially on
the perceptions of consumers as to the transitory or permanent nature of these
income changes.  Consequently, unless there is absolute certainty on behalf of
consumers that the current change in income is a permanent one it is likely
that consumption will respond by less than the change in income.
& Secondly, consumers’ expectations regarding the impact of various policy
measures or events on future “wealth” prospects can have an important
impact on present consumption patterns;  in other words influences other than
current disposable income, such as wealth, can impact on current levels of
consumer spending.12
%2;&2168037,2160227+,1*
Current income constitutes only a proportion of the resources available to
an individual consumer, with any meaningful measurement
encompassing total wealth, including existing financial and housing
assets allied to human wealth measured as the net present value of
expected future labour income.  In terms of the allocation of these
resources to lifetime consumption, given the substantial degree of
discretion which the consumer possesses, a reasonable initial hypothesis
is that the average life cycle consumer would desire to spread their
consumption in a reasonably even pattern over their lifetime.
In overall terms therefore consumption smoothing, given the expectation
of increasing lifetime income, implies borrowing or dissaving in young
adulthood and paying back or saving when older to cater for retirement.
Under this scenario, the average consumer has a reasonably good idea of
what his lifetime permanent income should be, with temporary income
changes eliciting the type of consumption smoothing mentioned in the
main text, whereas permanent changes would provoke a permanent shift
in consumption patterns.
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that temporary income disturbances,
which constitute the likely majority of country-specific income shocks,
have little effect on consumption behaviour.  Consumption smoothing in
the face of such temporary shocks offers the most appropriate
explanation for consumption being the most stable element of aggregate
demand, with consumers acting to defend living standards already
attained.  Furthermore, if future permanent income changes are currently
anticipated by consumers, such future changes can be reflected in current
consumption patterns.  Consequently, shifts in future expectations can
impact on the current behaviour of consumers.13
6(&7,21$5(:($/7+$1'&855(17,1&20(7+(
.(<'(7(50,1$1762)&2168037,21":+$7,67+(
52/(2),17(5(675$7(6
This section will examine in more detail the key determinants of consumption.
Unlike the previous section which stressed the primacy of the permanent income / life
cycle paradigm, this section will more critically examine the key assumptions
underlying this theory and will find it wanting in a number of respects in terms of real
life behaviour of consumers.  Following a discussion on the key driving forces
underlying consumer behaviour this section will provide evidence to back up its
contention that not only wealth but also disposable income influences consumption.
6(&7,21  .(< '5,9,1* )25&(6 81'(5/<,1* &21680(5
%(+$9,285 52/( 2) 7,0( +25,=21 7,0( 35()(5(1&( $1'
&$3,7$/0$5.(7,03(5)(&7,216
Three key factors influence an individuals decision making process in terms of
determining his consumption/savings split and in terms of determining the importance
he attaches to current as opposed to future income.  In essence these can be
summarised as his planning horizon, his time preferences and finally his ability in
practice to realise his perfect (his utility maximising or theoretically most satisfying)
consumption path i.e the extent to which he is faced with liquidity constraints
4.
The time horizon / time preference factors are the key determining influences on an
individuals calculation of his lifetime wealth.  Regarding the latter it is clear that the
length of his planning horizon (1 year V 50 years) and his preference as to current V
future consumption
5 play a determining role.  As regards the consumers ability to
realise his “utility maximising” consumption path this is largely determined by the
extent to which the consumer is in a financial position to smooth his consumption i.e.
can he borrow or lend at reasonable rates of interest whenever he wants or is he faced
with financial market constraints on his ability to do so.
Lets look at each of these three factors in turn in more detail.
 7,0( +25,=21 &216,'(5$7,216:  This particular feature can be simply
summarised as whether a consumer has a short or long planning horizon in terms of
his consumption / savings choices.  To meaningfully analyse this question it is
necessary to look more closely at a consumers motives for saving.
7+(25,(62)6$9,1*6: A wide variety of motives for household saving have been
put forward in the theoretical literature.  For convenience purposes these motives can
be grouped together into essentially three theories of savings with, as one would
                                                
4  The term liquidity constrained refers to those consumers whose spending over the short to medium
term is determined by fluctuations in their disposable income as opposed to their long-run wealth
position.
5 The rate of time preference can be estimated from the wealth/consumption relationship.  The life
cycle model of the latter relationship implies a relatively low rate of time preference in countries such
as Japan which have high saving ratios, with countries such as the US, with a relatively low saving
ratio, displaying a higher rate of time preference.14
intuitively expect, assumptions about an individual’s time horizon being one of the
essential differences between the competing hypotheses.
·  The  OLIH F\FOH PRGHO assumes that an individual’s time horizon is their own
lifetime and that their utility hinges solely on their own consumption.  The desire
to smooth one’s lifetime consumption path by evening out normal cyclical income
fluctuations provides the fundamental motive for saving/dissavings during
different periods of one’s life, with the need to provide sufficient resources for
retirement being the clearest example of these life-cycle effects.
·  The EHTXHVWPRGHO assumes that an individual’s time horizon is multi-generational
with strong ties linking current generations to their descendants and with
individuals driven to maximize not only their own utility but also that of future
generations through a bequest motive.
·  The SUHFDXWLRQDU\RU³EXIIHUVWRFN´WKHRU\RIVDYLQJ is built on the view that a
major motive for holding and accumulating assets is to shield one’s consumption
against future uncertainties such as unpredictable fluctuations or disruptions in
income or extraordinary health expenditures.  One of the intuitive implications of
this “buffer stock” model is that individuals with higher income uncertainty
should amass a greater stock of wealth to allow for this.
 7,0( 35()(5(1&( ())(&76 ,03$&7 2) 7+( ,17(5(67 5$7( 21
&2168037,21 $1' 6$9,1*6 +2: *5($7 ,6 7+( &2168037,21 5(63216( 72
9$5,$7,216,17+(5($/5$7(2),17(5(67
￿"
29(5$//52/(2),17(5(675$7(6
￿ Interest rates appear through two avenues in
the typical life-cycle model:
·  )LUVWO\, if the discount rate used by consumers to GLVFRXQWIXWXUHLQFRPH is related
to observed real rates of return, the latter interest rates are used as a parameter in
the model.  It should be noted that there is in reality a large discrepancy between
the two sets of interest rates with consumers tending to discount future income
flows at a much higher rate than that implied by observation of the real interest
rate.  For example, Hayashi (1982) found the discount rate for income used by US
households to be over 13% compared with 3½% for the real interest rate.  This
empirical evidence carries major implications for the real economy since the lower
the subjective discount rate the greater the impact in terms of thrifty behaviour and
by implication the greater the accumulation of non-human and human capital.
·  6HFRQGO\, the interest rate is included as a variable when testing for the presence
of LQWHUWHPSRUDOVXEVWLWXWLRQHIIHFWV.  A priori one would expect the sign of the
substitution effect to be negative in terms of current consumption since increases
in the interest rate reduce the relative price of goods to be consumed tomorrow
creating a substitution effect which tilts consumption towards the future.
Consequently consumers, irrespective of whether they are lenders or borrowers,
                                                
6 The interest elasticity or sensitivity of consumption and savings has big implications for the efficacy
of fiscal and monetary policy in terms of influencing business cycle developments.
7 Prior to Keynes’ PIH, the interest rate was given a large role in determining the choice between
consumption and saving (Fisher’s theory)15
have a choice to make between current as opposed to future consumption with the
expression of such basic intertemporal preferences impacting strongly on the time
profile of consumption.  As pointed out above there is a strong underlying
rationale attaching to the belief that consumers prefer consumption to follow a
reasonably steady path over time, with the implication being that intertemporal
substitutability may be low.
,17(57(0325$/68%67,787,21())(&76  As regards this latter point on the degree
of substitutability, it is essential to know whether the elasticity of substitution is low
or not in order to assess the degree of responsiveness of consumption to changes in
rates of return.  If, for example, consumer spending behaviour is not influenced
greatly by interest rate changes then attempts by governments to stimulate savings by,
for example, making the fiscal treatment of interest income more attractive will
ultimately prove futile.  Assessing the extent of this responsiveness to rates of return
changes is consequently an important area of empirical research with Hall (1988) and
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), amongst many others, examining this issue.
In general this research suggests that consumption growth responds relatively little to
variations in the real interest rate.  In fact most commentators would suggest that the
elasticity of substitution is definitely below unity and in all probability below one
half.  In other words there is a low degree of readiness on behalf of consumers to
substitute present for future consumption.
,1&20(())(&76: While the substitution effect is low it is nevertheless negative
which should mean that an increase in interest rates will result in a drop in current
consumption.  However, this need not necessarily be the case.  The intertemporal
dimension of consumption decisions is more complex than that.  The reason for this is
that the change in interest rates has an income effect as well as a substitution effect.
If, for example, a particular consumer is a net saver, the interest rate increase permits
the attainment of a higher consumption path than before and consequently the rate
hike would exert a positive income effect on consumers that are net savers.  In fact, at
the economy wide level, consumers are on average net savers since the stock of
wealth in the economy is positive with the result that an increase in interest rates has a
positive overall income effect both on present and future consumption.
:($/7+())(&76: Finally, it should be reiterated that interest rate changes also have
wealth effects, with rate increases reducing overall wealth through reducing the
present discounted value of future income flows.
29(5$//6800$5<2),17(5(675$7(())(&76: To summarise, therefore, interest
rate effects are ambiguous in terms of their impact on FXUUHQW consumption due to the
opposing influence of positive income and negative substitution effects.  At the level
of the individual consumer the impact on FXUUHQW consumption of course depends on
whether the latter is a net lender or borrower with increases in the real rate of interest
tending to increase the consumption of the former with the opposite impact on
borrowers.  Taken as a whole, interest rate increases would appear to reduce aggregate
consumption (i.e. both FXUUHQW DQG IXWXUH consumption) because of the wealth
declines associated with the heavier discounting of future income.
&$3,7$/0$5.(7,03(5)(&7,216: Liquidity constraints in effect determine
the extent to which a consumer can achieve his perfect consumption path.  This is an16
area which will be looked at in more detail later on in this section so at the moment all
that needs to be highlighted are the potential ways in which liquidity constraints can
impact on the level of consumption.  How do such constraints ensure that current
income is more important to the explanation of consumption changes than is
forecasted by the permanent income hypothesis.  Liquidity constraints impact on
consumption in essentially two ways:
·  )LUVWO\, binding liquidity constraints ensure that individuals consume less than
they would otherwise do.
·  6HFRQGO\, as stressed by Zeldes (1989), the expectation of such constraints binding
in the future, irrespective of whether they do so at present can impact negatively
on current consumption i.e. consumers precautionary savings are higher due to the
presence of liquidity constraints reflecting the need to insure oneself against the
effects of possible future declines in income.
In overall terms therefore liquidity constraints raise savings levels with some
empirical evidence (Jappelli and Pagano – 1994) to suggest that cross country
differences in aggregate saving may partly stem from cross country differences in
liquidity constraints.
6(&7,21'(7(50,1,1*7+(5(/$7,9(,03257$1&(2):($/7+9
&855(17 ,1&20( ,1 7(506 2) ,1)/8(1&,1* &2168037,21 7+(
(03,5,&$/(9,'(1&(
Given the discussion in section 2.1 regarding the three key influences on actual
consumer behaviour, it is clear that there are a number of highly credible reasons why
one would expect to see deviations from the consumer behaviour predictions
hypothesised by the permanent income thesis.  While consumption is undoubtedly a
positive function of lifetime human and non-human wealth, growing in fact one for
one over the long run, it also appears in the short-run to be constrained by current
disposable income, a large part of which is made up of current after-tax labour
income.  If, as assumed by the PIH, all consumers were highly rational and forward
looking and operated in a situation of perfectly functioning financial markets they
would be able to borrow and lend freely and smooth their lifetime consumption
patterns.  In reality a substantial proportion of consumers would not appear to
function in this way for a variety of reasons including:
·  )LUVWO\, uncertainty concerning future wealth calculations and income flows make
people subscribe to more risk averse or precautionary types of behaviour i.e.
people may insulate themselves against unfavourable outcomes by adopting more
prudent behaviour such as discounting future income at a higher rate to reflect the
greater uncertainty.  This is consistent with the results of Hayashi mentioned
earlier.
·  6HFRQGO\, a large proportion of consumers act in a simpler, less forward-looking,
fashion than theory would suggest with many using simple rules of thumb, such as
monitoring “buffer” stocks of liquid assets.  Consequently, to the extent that
consumers do look forward, their planning horizons appear to be much shorter
than theory presupposes, a proposition which can be intuitively accommodated if17
one accepts the pervasiveness of market imperfections, uncertainty and myopia or
backward looking behaviour.
·  7KLUGO\, some consumers may not be interested in smoothing their consumption
over their lifetime and may, for example, prefer to defer consumption to later in
life when in fact they have more time to enjoy their accumulated wealth.
·  )LQDOO\, even if an individual consumer wishes to borrow to realise a constant
level of lifetime consumption, the widespread recourse of banks to credit rationing
allied to other forms of liquidity constraints will ensure that in reality his or her
spending, at least in his early years, will not be front-loaded with debt and will be
restricted to his current levels of disposable income.  In other words, while
consumers may have the desire to even out consumption in circumstances of
fluctuating income, they may not have the ability to realise such an increase in
utility.
Given the logical appeal of the above reasoning, it is clear that a more realistic
characterisation of consumers actual behaviour is one in which consumption is
dependent not only on calculations of total lifetime wealth but also is heavily
influenced by current disposable income.  The key question then in terms of
explaining consumer spending patterns is determining the proportion of consumption
which is actually dependent on total wealth (i.e. financial wealth, housing wealth and
expectations of future labour income) and the proportion which is predicated on
current income levels.
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Establishing the relative importance of these primary determinants of consumption is
essentially an empirical question.  In the terminology used in the literature we must
decide the proportion of “liquidity constrained” v. “wealth constrained” households.
·  &DPSEHOODQG0DQNLZ (1989) estimate that up to one half of all households are of
the liquidity constrained, Keynesian-type, with the other half being typical life
cycle/permanent income consumers i.e. wealth constrained.  This ratio of course
would differ across countries with variations being dependent, amongst other
things, on the degree of liberalisation of domestic financial markets.  In fact, in
their research Campbell and Mankiw provide estimates of the consumption share
of such households in 6 countries with the estimates lying in the range 0.2 –0.6
and with their explanation for the cross-country differences linked to the relative
development of their respective credit markets.
The broad conclusion emanating from the above estimates appear to be further
corroborated from the results of 2 studies, reported in Blanchard (1997), which also
throw light on this question of whether consumers are either myopic, i.e. driven by
current income, or forward looking i.e. influenced by expectations of future income.
·  The first, a study by 9HQWLDQG:LVH looks at the savings behaviour of
people in anticipation of retirement.  This type of study provides valuable
empirical information regarding the extent to which people do forward planning
in order to smooth out the inevitable decline in their future employment income.
The results of this research appear to suggest, however, that few individuals have
planning horizons which stretch over their lifetime, with most giving little
consideration to the question of saving for retirement until their 40s.  In addition,18
while saving may start at that time, the reality is that for many their savings ratio
is vastly inadequate given normal retirement durations, with many in fact relying
almost exclusively on State support.
·  The second study by 3RWHUED looks at the impact on consumer behaviour
of a change in future expected income resulting from announced income tax cuts.
The package of tax cuts specifically referred to were those announced in 1981 by
the Reagan Administration and passed by the US Congress in July of the same
year.  The latter income tax cuts were substantial (i.e. a cumulative decline of
twenty three percent) and were to be phased in over a three year period 1981 –
1983 (5% in 1981, 10% in 1982 and 8% in 1983).  The key question addressed by
the study was whether and to what extent consumers reacted in the initial year of
the package to the anticipated decrease in labour taxes in the two subsequent
years.  Poterba concluded that no evidence could be found for any positive
consumption impact emanating from the pre-announced tax cuts.
While such evidence is undoubtedly not conclusive that present consumption
patterns are not affected by expectations of future income changes, since the
credibility of Governments’ fiscal actions must also be considered as a factor in
the present example, it does nevertheless suggest that the impact of expected
future tax changes on current consumption may be less substantial than some
commentators have suggested in the past.  Finally, this piece of research
highlights an important conclusion in relation to our present thinking on
consumption; how consumers respond to changes in their present or future
incomes depends crucially on their perception as to whether such changes are
likely to persist or are merely transitory.  In the above case, consumers clearly
suspected either that the Government would not deliver on the announced cuts or
that such cuts were likely to be reversed in the future.
·  ([DPSOHRI/LTXLGLW\&RQVWUDLQWVRSHUDWLQJDWWKH1DWLRQDO/HYHO: An interesting
example of the macro-economic importance of liquidity constraints is given by the
respective cases of East Germany and Poland in the early 1990s.  Both of the latter
were making rapid progress towards the establishment of market based economies
and consequently their long-run permanent income would have been expected to
rise substantially.  However, the extent to which both were able to borrow abroad
against future prosperity was dramatically different with East Germany being able
to run a large current account deficit because the servicing of its external debts
were, in effect, assumed by West Germany.  This, however, was not the case for
Poland where because of liquidity constraints i.e. an inability to sufficiently
borrow against future permanent income increases, Poland had to limit its
expenditure to more closely reflect its current income level.
&RQFOXVLRQ The permanent income / life cycle view of consumption which predicts
that wealth (i.e expectations of future income) is the driving force for consumption
would appear to be only partially true.  It is clear from the evidence presented that
current disposable income plays a key role in the decision-making process of a large
proportion of households.  It must be accepted that the existence of substantial market
imperfections, driven in the main by uncertainty on the part of banks concerning the
future prospects and incomes of individual clients, means in practice that borrowings,
justified on the basis of a household’s intertemporal budgetary constraint, are simply
not feasible with the implication being that current disposable income also plays a
major role in affecting aggregate consumption.19
%R[)RUHFDVWLQJ&RQVXPSWLRQ0RGHOOLQJ&RQVXPHU
%HKDYLRXULVDQHYROXWLRQDU\SURFHVV
)25(&$67)$,/85(6,16$1'6: Modelers reacted to their failure in the 1970s
to forecast the rise in savings which occurred, as a result of the impact of inflation on
consumer behaviour, by including an inflation variable in their models which acted as
a proxy for the inflation loss on liquid assets
8.  These consumption equations had to
be amended still further in the 1980s in a large number of countries in order to
account for their failure to forecast the opposite problem of a sharp decline in their
savings ratio which many attributed to the impact of financial sector deregulation.
Financial liberalisation, it was felt, had increased the spendability of previously
illiquid physical assets held by the personal sector and had acted to reduce the number
of liquidity constrained consumers in the economies affected.  Consequently models
were adapted to include variables on wealth especially physical wealth and were
increasingly focused on the forward looking behaviour of consumers.
These developments in terms of modelling mirrored the growing acceptance of the
SHUPDQHQW LQFRPHOLIH F\FOH K\SRWKHVHV ZLWK WKHLU HPSKDVLV RQ IRUZDUG ORRNLQJ
FRQVXPHUV DQG FRQVXPSWLRQ VPRRWKLQJ WR UHIOHFW WKH VPRRWKQHVV RI SHUPDQHQW
LQFRPH FKDQJHV.  The models have also taken on board the results of empirical
research indicating the presence of substantial liquidity constraints on consumption
with its implication that aggregate consumption responds to changes in current
income as well as in permanent income.
In overall terms therefore consumption functions have evolved over the last number
of decades from their original Keynesian roots to resemble the life cycle models of
consumption emphasising forward looking behaviour and allowing for the impact of
liquidity constraints.  Consequently, most modern models distinguish two types of
consumers, the forward looking or wealth constrained variety who smooth their
consumption profile in accordance with the life cycle hypothesis and the liquidity
constrained or backward looking variety who are restricted to their current incomes in
terms of their purchasing patterns.
                                                
8 The inflation rate is included in consumption functions as a proxy for “real wealth effects” i.e. a
perceived wealth loss by net saving consumers. (Note: inflation impacts on savings behaviour
essentially through a heightening of economic uncertainty).20
6HFWLRQ ,,, )XWXUH &RQVXPSWLRQ 7UHQGV LQ WKH
&RPPXQLW\:KDWDUHWKHOLNHO\NH\LQIOXHQFHVRYHU
WKHPHGLXPWRORQJUXQ"
How does the preceding, largely theoretical, framework help us in forecasting future
consumption trends in the Community ?  In particular, how will consumption react to
ongoing budgetary consolidation, further financial liberalisation, taxation and social
welfare reforms and demographic changes.  In this regard, if one accepts the long-run
predictions of the permanent income model, which most people do, it would appear
meaningless to do long range forecasts since consumption will simply be determined
by, in essence, an economy’s long-run trend growth rate.  Income and consumption
form a long-run cointegrating relationship with a long run unitary elasticity between
income and consumption ensuring that the latter is relatively constant as a proportion
of income.
Consequently, given the futility of long range forecasts, it appears more appropriate to
try to provide an insight into consumer behaviour and to convey a sense of the likely
evolution of the consumption/savings split in the Community over the medium to long
run.  In other words, by looking at the following concrete examples, which involve a
combination of structural and policy–induced business cycle influences, it is hoped to
flesh out the theoretical framework from Section 2:
·  &21680(5%(+$9,285$1'21*2,1*%8'*(7$5<&2162/,'$7,21
·  ,03$&7 21 /,48,',7< &21675$,176 2) 352*5(66,9( ),1$1&,$/
/,%(5$/,=$7,21
·  &2168037,215($&7,21726758&785$/5()250,17+()2502)7$;$1'
62&,$/:(/)$5(6<67(05()2506
·  ,03$&721&2168037,212)'(02*5$3+,&35(6685(6
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As highlighted in the 1998 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, despite the
commendable degree of budgetary consolidation achieved by virtually all of the
Member States in recent years, it is clear that supplementary efforts will be required in
most countries if compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact’s medium-term
objective of fiscal positions which are either close to balance or in surplus is to be
realised.
This should be seen in the context of EMU implying a fundamental shift in the ground
rules surrounding macro economic policies.  In this regard, if the public authorities
continue to demonstrate a credible commitment to public deficits and debt reduction
this may have far reaching implications on the behaviour of forward looking
consumers and investors (see Box 3).
As regards consumers, the positive expectations associated with a significant package
of deficit reduction, in terms of their anticipation of an easing of future tax pressures,
could engender an upward revision to consumption plans.  Such “crowding in” effects
would feed through in the form of reductions in long-term interest rates, facilitated by
the boost to national savings emanating from the consolidation process.21
The extent of such ³FURZGLQJLQ´ HIIHFWV will be significantly dictated by four
essential features of consumer behaviour.
·  )LUVWO\, the planning horizon of households; are they “life-cycle” or more
“Ricardian”
·  6HFRQGO\, the degree to which they believe that the present Government actions
are credible i.e. the response of consumers will be largely dictated by their
expectations as to the transitory or permanent nature of the Government’s actions.
·  7KLUGO\, on the assumption that consumers generally feel that the Government
action is credible, the response of an individual consumer will depend on the
extent to which he or she has the ability to borrow or lend freely in order to
smooth their consumption over time.  If consumers do have that power (i.e. they
do not face credit or liquidity restrictions) then you would expect to see a positive
response in the current consumption behaviour of households in anticipation of
on-going reductions in public deficits and debt.
·  )LQDOO\, the response of consumers will be influenced by their degree of sensitivity
to the inevitable interest rate changes which will occur. We saw earlier that this
interest elasticity would appear to be low.
The consumption boost from the credible fiscal consolidation efforts of Governments
will feed through as households adjust their savings behaviour in expectation of lower
future tax liabilities.  The overall impact of this shift from public saving to household
dis-saving will nevertheless be positive in terms of overall national saving.  As
pointed out in a number of recent Commission policy documents the most effective
way of increasing national savings is through boosting public savings since, in an
historical perspective, the private savings ratio has remained remarkably stable in the
Community over the last number of decades with changes to corporate and household
saving ratios tending to cancel each other out over time.22
%2;&21680(5%(+$9,285$1'7+(())(&7,9(1(662)
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This box looks at some of the issues raised in the main text in more detail.
Any analysis of WKH LPSDFWRI FKDQJHV LQILVFDOSROLF\ RQ WKH HFRQRP\ depends crucially on the researchers
assumptions in relation to consumption and saving behaviour.  Consequently, the likelihood of ongoing fiscal
consolidation in the Community over the coming years in order to bring structural deficits down towards zero
means that the present analysis should look at the implications of this policy course for savings and consumption.
At this stage it is only necessary to point out that one’s views as to the WLPHKRUL]RQRIFRQVXPHUV (i.e. have
consumers finite or infinite time horizons) and of the extent to which consumers are ZHDOWKYFUHGLWFRQVWUDLQHG
can have significant implications in terms of the estimated effectiveness of fiscal policy action.
·  If, for example, one were to subscribe to the 5LFDUGLDQFODVVLFDOYLHZ that with infinitely lived, forward
looking, rational consumers then one would expect changes in Government debt to have minimal, if any, real
effects in terms of economic activity since intertemporal revisions to private sector consumption and savings
decisions would tend to offset the effects of any such Government action.  In the Ricardian scheme of things,
current generations have strong inter-generational ties.  In the case of the latter type of ³5LFDUGLDQ´
KRXVHKROGV the future tax implications of increases in Government debt are likely to be fully offset by
equivalent changes in private consumption and saving behaviour because of the longer planning horizons of
such households.
·  Alternatively, one could subscribe to a view of fiscal policy which, although continuing to embrace the basic
assumption of forward looking optimizing behaviour, suggests that private sectorVDYLQJVEHKDYLRXUPD\QRW
EHDVVHQVLWLYHWRFKDQJHVLQSXEOLFGHILFLWV, as a strict adherence to the rational expectations viewpoint would
imply, with shorter planning horizons for consumers (i.e. life cycle considerations) coupled with capital
market imperfections having implications for the real economy impact of fiscal policy. In the case of the latter
³OLIHF\FOH´KRXVHKROGV, since part of the debt burden is assumed to fall on future generations, with which
they are assumed to have no strong ties
9, the fiscal change is not fully offset by private sector behaviour and
consequently the Government debt increase has larger real economy effects.  These latter ³QRQ5LFDUGLDQ´
HIIHFWV can be further amplified if consumers are assumed to face liquidity constraints i.e. credit restrictions
which impinge on their capacity to smooth lifetime consumption by borrowing against future incomes.  In
other words unlike in the case of Ricardian equivalence the level of national savings can under the neo-
classical paradigm be affected by changes in public savings with significant implications ensuing for interest
rate developments and for wealth / asset accumulation.
The essential point therefore is that ILVFDO SROLF\ FKDQJHV FDQ KDYH UHODWLYHO\ ODUJH UHDO HFRQRP\ HIIHFWV if
consumers firstly are of the “life cycle” as opposed to the Ricardian variety and consequently do not fully allow for
i.e. “excessively discount” the future tax implications of present day fiscal actions and secondly if consumers are
“liquidity constrained” to the extent that current consumption is highly sensitive to changes in current disposable
income.  If both these assumptions hold, as they are assumed to do in most “mainstream” econometric models,
then the real economy impact of fiscal policy changes can depart significantly from the Ricardian view of
Government deficits.
Simulations in Section 4 of this text assess the extent of such crowding out effects of Government debt using the
Commission Services’ Quest 2 model and emphasises in particular WKHFURZGLQJRXWRISULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWGXHWR
WKHKLJKHUUHDOUDWHVRILQWHUHVWassociated with excessive consumption of available national resources i.e. a lower
pool of savings which in turn results over the long-run in a reduction in real income and consumption levels (i.e.
reductions in sustainable real standards of living) as a result of the lower average level of capital accumulation.
Finally, because consumption and savings do not appear to be highly VHQVLWLYHWRLQWHUHVWUDWHFKDQJHV a large rise
in rates may be necessitated to bring savings rates back into balance, thereby adding further to the long run
crowding out effects of Government debt.
                                                
9 Individual consumers are assumed to have finite lives i.e. there is no formal link between generations (i.e. the life
cycle view)23
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The process of financial market liberalization has already impacted strongly on the
pattern of household consumption in at least some of the Member States.  This is
likely to accelerate with the advent of EMU and with the inevitable widening of the
range of financial instruments which will be made available to consumers across the
continent.  It would be expected that such liberalization will result in a further easing
in the liquidity constraints faced by households, with in particular the potential for a
substantial increase in the spendability of previously illiquid assets.  With consumers
given the means to rearrange their wealth portfolios in this way, they will be in a
better position than at present to smooth their consumption over time.  Consequently,
over time one would expect to see a GHFOLQHLQWKHVKDUHRIOLTXLGLW\FRQVWUDLQHG
KRXVHKROGV in consumption functions, with permanent income driven households
rising in importance.
One of the assumptions underlying the PIH is that access to perfect capital markets
ensures that consumers will be able to smooth lifetime consumption through
borrowing or lending at the same interest rate.  As the process of financial sector
liberalization gradually renders Europe’s capital markets somewhat less imperfect
than at present then the sensitivity of current consumption to current income will
concurrently fall over time as the latter has been shown to be linked to the degree of
financial deregulation operating in any given country.  Eventually, perhaps, ongoing
liberalization will provide the empirical evidence to support Hall’s contention that if
consumers adopt rational expectations and determine their consumption from
pemanent income it can be shown that FRQVXPSWLRQZLOOIROORZDUDQGRPZDON i.e. it
is not forecastable.  In fact, there is little doubt that liquidity constraints offer one of
the main explanations for the widespread failure of consumption behaviour to follow
the random walk pattern predicted by Hall.
On the policy front, with financial liberalization removing at least part of these
constraints we should be predicting PRUH SRZHUIXO UHDO LQWHUHVW UDWH HIIHFWV RQ
FRQVXPSWLRQRYHUWKHFRPLQJGHFDGHV.
A word of warning is necessary at this stage in terms of the RSWLPDOVSHHGRIILQDQFLDO
GHUHJXODWLRQ.  Given that the net effect of liquidity constraints is to boost the overall
level of savings through a form of “forced” thriftiness, it is clear that the “big bang”
approach to liberalization carries major, once-off, essentially macro, risks for the
economy due to the rapid mobilization of a potentially large stock of savings which
have been accumulated over, in many cases, a considerable period of time.  This was
indeed the experience of countries which underwent rapid and fundamental
liberalization in recent decades where the release of a wave of pent-up demand in the
economy led eventually to overheating problems manifesting themselves.
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Supply side reforms which augment the potential growth rate of the Community’s
economies feed consumer’s expectations of higher future lifetime incomes.  Such
reforms are likely to have a positive overall effect on savings behaviour taken over the24
longer run but the shorter run impact is likely to be a boost to consumption as the
benefits of the structural reforms gradually become apparent and households adjust to
the expectations of higher life-long living standards.
7$;5()250: There are a number of channels through which a country’s tax system
can impact on aggregate household savings:
·  Impact on lifetime wealth calculations
·  Impact on the rate of return on saving
·  Impact resulting from the progressivity of the tax system and from the distribution
between direct and indirect taxes.
Regarding the relationship between taxation and household savings behaviour there is
substantial evidence to suggest that the negative impact of income taxes on household
savings is of a different order of magnitude to that of consumption taxes.  Direct
income taxes are both progressive and focused essentially on the working age
population and tend therefore to disproportionately affect the high savings groups in a
country’s population.  These high savers are not as affected by the indirect
consumption taxes since the latter are more evenly distributed across age groups and
income bands.  Consequently, if promoting savings is an important public policy
objective, this evidence has significant implications for tax policy in terms of the
distribution of income and consumption taxes in the overall tax structure of
economies with a shift towards the latter indirect form of taxation, whilst keeping the
overall tax burden unchanged, potentially boosting the aggregate rate of household
savings.
62&,$/6(&85,7<$1':(/)$5(5()250: The generosity, coverage and financing
of the present social security and welfare system in Europe is widely perceived to play
a role in household savings behaviour.  In terms of financing, the latter burden is
shifted more in the direction of the high income earners if a policy of tax financing as
opposed to social security contributions is adopted.  In terms of the growing
generosity and coverage of the system, it is accepted that the improvements it has
brought in terms of income and health safety nets reduced the incentives for self-
provision.  This is particularly evident in the case of retirement saving with the growth
of public pension schemes severely reducing the motive for households to privately
provide for their old age.
Consequently the post war expansion of the “social safety net” is one of the
explanatory factors underlying the secular declines in savings rates in industrial
countries.  While providing insurance against temporary or permanent losses in
income these safety nets reduced uncertainty about future income flows and in the
aggregate stimulated consumption.  With a partial reversal of these trends over the
coming decades being inevitable because of demographic, public finance pressures
and other factors, savings and consumption patterns will be affected accordingly.
6800$5<: It is clear therefore, that the level of public savings itself is by no means
the only avenue through which public policy influences the savings decisions of
households with the structure of taxation allied to the reach and generosity of the
social welfare system being equally important.  These latter avenues for impacting on
household saving need to be carefully evaluated in the context of the present desire of
Member State Governments, as agreed to in successive Broad Guidelines exercises, to
overhaul their tax and social security systems.25
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The ageing of the European population over the coming decades would appear to be
an inescapable fact.  This ageing process is linked to two essential factors:
·  Firstly, the progressive lengthening in life expectancy; and
·  Secondly, a fall in fertility rates to below the critical threshold levels (i.e. around
2) required for generational renewal.
It is envisaged that this ageing process, leading to higher old age dependency ratios in
most of the Member States, will generate downward pressure on household savings
rates in the countries concerned.  This conclusion is derived mainly from an analysis
of the phenomenon in the framework of the life-cycle hypothesis described earlier.
Consequently, the reaction of consumption could be very different if one were to
subscribe to either the bequest or “buffer stock” models of savings.
The difficulty in forecasting the likely outcome is, of course, linked to the fact that
nothing is available in terms of historical precedents.  It must be accepted, therefore,
that while an increasing average age in Member States populations would prima facie
be expected to result in significant shifts in both the structure and level of
consumption there is clearly nothing inevitable about the likely final impact of these
long-run changes in population age structures.  Circumspection is indeed justified in
this case given firstly the highly progressive nature of the process, secondly the
difficulty of predicting how consumers will respond to these changing demographics
(i.e. will their savings behaviour change etc) and finally given the proven flexibility of
most economic sectors which, when combined with, the slow pace of demographic
change should ensure that the productive system will have both the capacity and the
time to ensure a relatively smooth adaptation process.
Against the background of these very real uncertainties simulation n°3, in the next
section, provides an overview of the general macroeconomic impact of such
demographic changes on the basis of the life-cycle paradigm.26
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The behaviour of households in the Commission Services’ QUESTII model
10 is
characterised by the Life Cycle Hypothesis.  The latter is a generalization of the
Permanent Income Model since it allows for the analysis of consumption and saving
behaviour of households with possibly only a finite time horizon.  The Life Cycle
Hypothesis is an elegant way to model the basically intertemporal savings-
consumption problem of households.  According to this hypothesis, households base
their consumption decision on a discounted stream of current and future expected net
income and on their current stock of financial wealth   The basic reason for doing this
is derived from a concept of inter-temporal utility maximization of households,
whereby they find it optimal to smooth consumption over time.
The calculation of permanent income incorporates the current and discounted future
expected net income stream the household sector is expected to earn.  It consists of all
non-capital income, i.e. net labour income and all other transfers to households,
including unemployment benefits.  The other determinant for private consumption is
financial wealth which, at the aggregate level, consists of the market value of firms in
the domestic economy, the net foreign asset position and government debt.
It should be noted, however, that although government debt enters the definition for
private wealth, this does not mean that it has a positive effect on private consumption
because households deduct future tax payments and reductions in transfer payments,
which are required to service the debt, from their permanent income.  This is also
known as Ricardian Equivalence.  This proposition does, however, only hold in its
extreme form for infinitely lived consumers.  Life cycle consumers will discount the
future more heavily and thereby underestimate the tax burden associated with
government debt.  Consequently they will regard government debt at least partially as
net wealth of the household sector.  As Summers and Poterba have shown, however,
this net wealth effect of government debt is negligible in the life cycle model.
Finally, the empirical specification of the model allows for a deviation to the above
formulation reflecting the findings of many empirical studies of consumer behaviour
which point to a sizeable fraction of consumption being dependent on real current
disposable income because of liquidity constrained private households.
6,08/$7,21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Simulation results using the QUESTII model confirm the long-run non-Keynesian
effects budgetary consolidations may have.  Tables 1 and 2 summarise the results
11 of
two simulations
12 for the European Union as a whole.  The first one assumes that
consumers are not liquidity constrained in their consumption demand, whereas the
second simulation assumes that consumers are liquidity constrained and that 50
                                                
10 See Roeger and in’t Veld (1997a)
11 The results are reported as percentage deviations between the simulated and the baseline paths.
12 For both simulations, simultaneous shocks are given to tax rates and to public expenditure. The
magnitude of the shocks captures the fiscal consolidation policies followed in the EU during the 1990s.27
percent of their consumption demand depends on their current disposable income with
the other 50 percent being dependent on their permanent income.
Tables 1 and 2 show that contractionary fiscal policies may in the long run generate
expansionary effects.  This is due to the forward-looking expectations of economic
agents about the future tax cuts implied by reductions in government expenditure in
the present time period.  When consumers are not liquidity constrained, they increase
their consumption demand from the beginning, i.e. as soon as the public expenditure
cuts are announced.  They integrate, from the beginning, the future cuts in taxes in
their life-cycle income, and given the hypothesis that they are not liquidity
constrained, they base their current consumption demand on the increased permanent
income.  Private consumption demand increases by 0.2 percent in the first year, and
continues to increase up to 1.1 percent after 11 years.
The results of the simulation with liquidity constraints on consumption demand also
give interesting insights as to the short and long-term effects of fiscal consolidation.
In this case, consumption demand declines slightly at the beginning given that, in this
scenario, 50% of consumption demand depends on current disposable income and
therefore the impact of future tax cuts is not fully integrated into current decisions.
On the other hand, consumption demand increases by much more later on in the
period as the tax cuts come on stream (2.2 percent after 11 years instead of 1.1 percent
without liquidity constraints).
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It is generally recognised that the trend increase in labour taxes in the EU should be
reversed.  However, some simulation exercises with the QUESTII model show that
budget-neutral reductions in labour taxes would have very different effects depending
on how the reduction is compensated for.  A cut in labour taxes if it is accompanied
by, for example, an increase in VAT rates or by a general reduction in government
spending or by a reduction in transfer payments, leads to higher private consumption
and growth in the long run, whereas the effects are negative if the compensation is
carried out through higher corporate taxes (see Table 3).
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Ageing will have direct effects on savings and consumption patterns, but also indirect
effects through its pressure on government budgets.  QUESTII simulations on the
budgetary costs of demographic changes show that the form of financing of the future
increase in transfer spending may have dramatic effects, depending on whether labour
taxes or VAT increases are the preferred financing option.  Table 4 shows the long-
term (steady state) negative effects on growth, consumption and investment of
hypothetical future tax increases to finance the costs of demographic changes.29
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